

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA	:	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
	:	PENNSYLVANIA
	:	
v.	:	
	:	
	:	
DANIEL GLICK BEILER	:	
	:	
Appellant	:	No. 329 MDA 2026

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 11, 2026
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-36-CR-0000319-2021

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., KING, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:

FILED: OCTOBER 26, 2026

Appellant, Daniel Glick Beiler, appeals *pro se* from the February 11, 2026, Order of the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas denying his petition for relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (hereinafter "PCRA"). After what review is possible despite Appellant's woefully deficient briefing, we affirm. Further, Appellant's motion filed September 17, 2026, is denied.

As this Court has previously observed relative to this matter:

On August 13, 2021, [Appellant] on criminal information 319-2021 pled guilty to one (1) count of sexual assault, one (1) count of statutory sexual assault, two (2) counts of involuntary deviant sexual intercourse, one (1) count of unlawful contact with a minor (F-1), one (1) count of incest, four (4) counts of indecent assault, two (2) counts of corruption of minors, one (1) unlawful contact with a minor (F-3), and two (2) counts indecent assault without

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

consent of other.[FN1] On November 29, 2021, Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of ten (10) to thirty (30) years' incarceration.

[FN1] 18 Pa.C.S. § 3124.1, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3122.1, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3123(a)(7), 18 Pa.C.S. § 6318(a)(1), 18 Pa.C.S. § 4302, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(7), 18 Pa.C.S. § 6301(a)(1)(ii), 18 Pa.C.S. § 6318(a)(1), 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(8).

On December 2, 2021, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion for modification of sentence, which was denied the same day. On November 27, 2022, Appellant filed a [petition for relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA)]. After filing an amended PCRA [petition], [the PCRA] court granted Appellant's PCRA [petition] on June 12, 2023[. O]n August 7, 2023, Appellant was [resentenced] to an aggregate term of eight (8) to twenty (20) years' incarceration.

On July 2, 2024, Appellant filed a [pro se] writ of mandamus, which was denied on July 10, 2024.

Commonwealth v. Beiler, 344 A.3d 1090 (Pa. Super. 2025)(*unpublished memorandum*).

Beiler appealed the July 2, 2024, denial to this Court, which upon review determined that the issues raised in his petition for writ of mandamus were cognizable under the PCRA. ***Id.*** Therefore, Appellant's *pro se* filing ought to have been treated as a PCRA petition, and as the grant of Appellant's first PCRA petition resulted in imposition of a new sentence, "Appellant had a rule-based right to counsel" for the purposes of the instant petition. ***Id.*** Thus, the matter was remanded for the appointment of counsel or, in the alternative, for a hearing pursuant to ***Commonwealth v. Grazier***, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998). ***Id.***

The PCRA court set forth the subsequent procedural history as follows:

On July 16, 2025, this Court appointed Christopher Lyden, Esq. to represent Appellant for his Post-Conviction Relief Act Petition (hereinafter "PCRA Petition"). Appellant filed a request to have counsel removed on September 3, 2025. This Court held a Grazier hearing on October 15, 2025; this Court disallowed Appellant from representing himself due to Appellant's incapability of answering this Court's colloquy questions and complete misunderstanding of the law.

Counsel filed a Motion to withdraw Appearance on December 24, 2025. On January 22, 2026, this Court found Appellant's PCRA to be meritless and filed a 907 Notice of Intent to Dismiss, allowing counsel to withdraw from representation; Appellant's PCRA Petition was then dismissed without a hearing on February 11, 2026. Appellant filed a timely Notice of Appeal on February 25, 2026. On February 26, 2026, this Court issued an Order, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), directing the parties to file a concise statement of the matters complained of on appeal (hereinafter "1925(b) Order"). On March 19, 2026, Appellant filed his Concise Statement of Matters complained of on appeal. The Commonwealth filed its response on March 31, 2026.

PCRA Court Opinion filed April 9, 2026, at 1-2.

As noted by the PCRA Court, Appellant's concise statement is indeed "anything but concise," where Appellant listed thirty-one issues, and many of the issues presented are redundant. ***Id.*** Appellant continues this pattern of disorganization in the brief submitted to this Court, wherein he flagrantly disregards and defies the Rules of Appellate Procedure and submits a deficient brief which does not include such fundamental components as identification of the order in question, as is required by Pa.R.A.P. 2115, or a statement of the factual and procedural history, as is required by Pa.R.A.P. 2117¹. Nor, for that

¹ Rather, Appellant merely indicates that as the requisite information for ruling on his issues is included in the record on appeal, "reproduction of the same" (Footnote Continued Next Page)

matter, is Appellant's argument separated into distinct sections addressing each question to be raised on appeal supported by citation to and discussion of pertinent authorities, as is required by Pa.R.A.P. 2119.

[A]lthough [we are] willing to liberally construe materials filed by a *pro se* litigant, *pro se* status confers no special benefit upon the appellant. To the contrary, any person choosing to represent himself in a legal proceeding must, to a reasonable extent, assume that his lack of expertise and legal training will be his undoing."

Jordan v. Pa. State Univ., 276 A.3d 751, 761 (Pa. Super. 2022)(citing ***Wilkins v. Marsico***, 2006 PA Super 188, 903 A.2d 1281, 1284-1285 (Pa.Super. 2006).

As the overwhelming majority of Appellant's arguments are presented without citation to the record on appeal, he did not present a statement of the case, and he cites to utterly bewildering authority without explanation², we

[in his brief] would be redundant and is not necessary for this Honorable Court's review of this matter." Appellant's Brief at 8. As will be addressed below, we disagree.

² For example, Appellant seems to argue in several issues throughout his brief that he is entitled to release where he paid his debt to the Commonwealth in a financial sense; specifically, Appellant contends that he complied with the requirements of 42 Pa.C.S. § 5108, concerning Imprisonment for Debt. Appellant's Brief at 11. However, as discussed above, Appellant is currently serving a sentence resulting from his entering a plea of guilty to charges relating to sexual assault. Nowhere in his brief does Appellant offer any coherent explanation as to how § 5108 is at all relevant to the instant matter. This Court is thus incapable of reviewing Appellant's arguments to this and many other points throughout Appellant's brief.

find the only reviewable issue presented in his brief is his first, and the rest are waived.

In this sole surviving issue, Appellant contends the PCRA court erred by appointing counsel over and against Appellant's objections where the Court allegedly failed to conduct a full and complete colloquy during the October 15, 2025, **Grazier** hearing and also that the denial of Appellant's right to represent himself was based in part upon the Court's prejudice against the Amish people.

However,

Generally, an actual claim or controversy must be present at all stages of the judicial process for the case to be actionable or reviewable. . . . If events occur to eliminate the claim or controversy at any stage in the process, the case becomes moot." J.S. v. Whetzel, 2004 PA Super 406, 2004 PA Super 406, 860 A.2d 1112, 1118 (Pa.Super. 2004) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "An issue can become moot during the pendency of an appeal due to an intervening change in the facts of the case or due to an intervening change in the applicable law." In re Cain, 590 A.2d 291, 292, 527 Pa. 260 ([Pa.] 1991). "An issue before a court is moot if in ruling upon the issue the court cannot enter an order that has any legal force or effect." Rivera v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections, 2003 PA Super 447, 2003 PA Super 447, 837 A.2d 525, 527 (Pa.Super. 2003).

Deutsche Bank Nat. Co. v. Butler, 2005 PA Super 47, 868 A.2d 574, 577 (Pa. Super. 2005).


Even should this Court reverse the trial court's appointment of counsel following the allegedly deficient **Grazier** hearing, such a ruling would have no effect where counsel was permitted to withdraw shortly after appointment. To the extent Appellant contends that counsel's petition to withdraw pursuant to

Turner and **Finley** prejudiced him, we note that his *pro se* petition was previously denied by the trial court prior to this Court's remand of this matter and subsequent appointment of counsel. Thus counsel's opining in his petition to withdraw that Appellant's issues were indeed meritless cannot be construed to have prejudiced Appellant in any meaningful sense. We therefore find Appellant's challenge to the appointment of counsel moot. Appellant sought to proceed *pro se*, and to that end he challenged the appointment of counsel; he now appears before this Court *pro se* following counsel's withdrawal. We will not waste judicial resources reviewing that appointment where there is no evidence Appellant was prejudiced thereby, and thus no ruling by this Court would have any legal effect.

As Appellant's only reviewable issue merits no relief, we affirm the PCRA Court's denial of Appellant's petition. Furthermore, Appellant's motion for rule to show cause seeking explanation from this Court "as to why the Petitioner's appeal has not been responded to," is denied as moot.

Order Affirmed. Motion denied.

Judgment Entered.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Benjamin D. Kohler", is written over a horizontal line.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 10/26/2026